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Resumen:   
 
 
Este  artículo  presenta  el  proyecto  de  investigación  que  intenta  iluminar  los  mecanismos  que 
vinculan el clientelismo con la informalidad.  En particular la investigación se concentra en las 
interacciones que tienen lugar durante la competencia electoral e intenta proporcionar un marco 
analítico para comprender los mecanismos económicos subyacentes en la competencia electoral en 
América Latina. Esta competencia está caracterizada por asimetrías entre los políticos (credibilidad 
y habilidad para movilizar votantes) y asimetrías entre los votantes (ingreso y participación en 
cierto segmento de la economía) ambos inmersos en un ambiente de baja calidad institucional (débil 
imperio de la ley). El artículo expone la evidencia empírica que motivó la investigación, discute los 
conceptos y literatura centrales y presenta un ejercicio exploratorio basado en el modelo de votación 
probabilística  como  un  punto  de  partida  en  la  formalización  del  problema.  En  esta  primera 
aproximación se muestra que el político clientelista en el poder puede proveer más bienes públicos 
cuando su maquinaria política es suficientemente rentable y la sociedad es altamente inequitativa.  
En la medida en que el político entrante tiene su nicho en los votantes ricos quienes demandan bajos 
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This paper presents a research project aimed to throw light on the mechanisms linking clientelism 
and  informality.  It  particularly  focuses  on  interactions  between  these  phenomena  at  electoral 
competition. It intends to provide an analytical framework to understand the economic underlying 
mechanisms of electoral competition in Latin American countries. This competition is characterized 
by asymmetries between politicians (credibility and ability to mobilize voters) and asymmetries 
between  voters  (income  and  participation  in  a  certain  segment  of  the  economy)  amidst  an 
environment of low institutional quality (i.e. weak rule of law). The paper provides the motivating 
empirical evidence, discusses the main concepts and literature, and finally advances an exploratory 
exercise  built  upon  the  probabilistic  voting  model  a  starting  point  in  the  formalization  of  the 
problem. In this first approximation, it is shown that the clientelistic incumbent would provide more 
public goods if his machine politics is profitable enough and the society is highly unequal. To the 
extent that the entrant politician has her political clout in richer voters that want lower tax rates, the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent studies of the World Bank on the economic performance of Latin American are 
titled “Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History?” (2004) and 
“Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and Vicious Circles” (2006). These titles refer to 
diagnoses of a bad social equilibrium in the region in which inequality and institutions that 
hamper economic growth are sturdily entrenched. Also they point out that the historical 
legacy  of  the  region  greatly  contributed  to  structure  unstable  democracies  wherein  the 
egalitarian ideals of liberal thinking have been elusive. Instead development/poverty traps, 
or vicious circles have prevailed.  
 
Nevertheless, these analyses state that institutions can be changed and that path dependency 
could  be  turned  around  through  policymaking.  One  decade  of  economic  and  political 
reforms  in  Latin  American,  the  promising  1990s,  was  a  first  step  in  building  better 
economies  and  sound  democracies.  Yet,  these  reforms  proved  to  be  insufficient  and 
revealed the complexity of breaking vicious circles as well as the poor understanding of 
reformers.  
 
Not  surprisingly,  unlocking  development  traps  demands  to  shed  more  light  on  the 
interaction between politics and economics. This research was conceived under this belief 
and the observation that in the last two decades, the region has experienced a renewed 
resurgence of particularistic redistribution in politics as well as an increase in Informality. 
These phenomena raise serious concern because they hamper the progress that the region 
has achieved since the toxic 1980s leading to higher inequality, populism and political 
instability.  
 
On one hand, particularistic redistribution in politics, which in Latin America I identify 
with  clientelism,  undersupplies  public  goods  and  concentrates  political  competition  on 
targeted  rewards  and  spending.  Also,  the  reliance  on  patron-client  networks  delays  the 
process  of  democratic  maturity  as  low  degrees  of  political  coordination  among  voters 
remained and political accountability stays remote. On the other hand, a large Informal 
sector concentrates an important proportion of agents in low aggregate productivity and 
small  scale  activities,  with  low  technology,  and  rigid  constrains  on  human  capital 
accumulation and credit access. In addition, Informality undermines the state capacity via 
lower tax collection and poor checks and balances from citizens.  
 
In this analysis I argue that clientelism and Informality have a double-way relationship 
interacting through the quality of institutions that they jointly structure. First, clientelistic 
politics  manifests  itself  through  large  and  inefficient  burocracies,  and  state  corruption 
which translate into high opportunity cost of tax and business regulation compliance for 
citizens.  In this line of reasoning, clientelism encourages  Informality. Second, Informal 
agents, especially those that chose to “exit” the formal system (not those who are excluded) 
and do not internalize the costs and the benefits of a good government, have incentives to 
vote  for  clientelistic  politicians.  These  politicians  base  their  electoral  support  on  the 





the  only  credible  policies  in  a  context  of  failed  government.  In  this  line  of  reasoning 
Informality encourages clientelism.  
 
This  research  project  aims  at  throwing  light  on  the  mechanisms  that  link  these  two 
phenomena. In particular, I focus on the interactions between clientelism and Informality in 
electoral  competition.  The  general  objective  is  to  provide  an  analytical  framework  to 
understand the underlying mechanisms of electoral competition in developing countries. 
This  competition  is  characterized  by  asymmetries  between  politicians  (credibility  and 
ability to mobilize voters) and asymmetries between voters (income and participation in a 
certain segment of the economy) amidst an environment of low institutional quality (i.e. 
low  rule  of  law).  The  specific  objective  is  to  provide  empirical  evidence  on  these 
mechanisms for some Latin American countries.  
 
By focusing on electoral competition, I explore the intuition that clientelism could depress 
political competition. Thus, elements as the supply of politicians/parties, entry barriers and 
biases in electoral strategies that entrants face when contesting clientelistic incumbents are 
examined. Mechanisms that encourage political competition would pave a sounder way to 
development. By bringing Informality into the picture, I investigate under which conditions 
a  dual  economy  sustains  clientelistic  politicians  in  office.  In  this  way,  the  economic 
incentives and conflict  among the demand side of politics, that is, voters are enriched. 
Informality in its “exit” side has been studied as an economic choice in a context of low 
state enforcement  and low tax morale. Emphasizing this  side of the political  exchange 
would highlight individually rational but collectively harmful attitudes of Latin American 
citizens before their development traps.  
 
Specifically, the problem of Informality can be seen as a coordination problem because 
voters find the exchange with clientelistic politicians individually optimal. However, this 
exchange is collectively harmful as it leads to negative externalities like selection of bad 
politicians, bad institutions and underprovision of public goods. This research analyzes the 
role of elections as coordination mechanisms and its connection with the Informality trap. 
The paper develops as follows. Section two introduces the concept of , literature review and 
some empirical facts on clientelism and Informality, which leads to identify the research 
niche of this project. Section three provides a static model of electoral competition that 
captures the interactions between clientelism and Informality in a simple set up as a starting 
point in the formalization of the problem. The model builds upon the probabilistic voting 
model  developed  by  Persson  and  Tabellini  (2000)  and  Robinson  and  Verdier  (2003). 
Finally section four briefly discusses the insights of the model.  
 
 
2.  Clientelism,  Informality  and  Development  Traps:  Notions,  Evidence  and 
Relationships 
 
In this section these two concepts are discussed, along with the literature review and some 
related facts on the Latin America’s experience. The goal of this section is to build the 
conceptual framework of this research project.  





2.1 The notion of Clientelism  
 
Clientelism is defined here as an electoral political strategy whereby a candidate or party 
offers  a  reward  to  an  individual  voter  in  exchange  for  his/her  electoral  support.  This 
exchange  is  direct  and  based  on  excludable  benefits  and  services.  Clientelism  includes 
practices as patronage (public sector employment), vote buying, deliberated omission of 
law enforcement, and personalistic grants of public contracts, among others.     
 
It  is  a  self-enforced  two-sided  relationship  in  which  both  parties  make  a  cost-benefit 
analysis when entering in the exchange. Patron and client obtain a reward in the exchange 
and when the patron’s extrinsic motivations are stronger than his/her intrinsic ones, the 
rent-extraction behavior brings into scene the agency-problem. Futhermore, given that the 
clientelistic exchange is voluntary, problems of commitment are at the very heart of the 
relationship since both the candidate and the voter could find beneficial to renege on their 
promises.  Thus,  a  persistent  clientelistic  exchange  implies  a  repeated  interaction  that 
sustains each side’s reputation and its self-enforcement. This interaction manifests itself 
through clientelistic networks which guarantee the direct contact between the patron and 
the client and create informational advantages to the patron. As these networks facilitate 
voter  monitoring  and  electoral  mobilization,  they  confer  advantages  to  clientelistic 
incumbent over non-clientelistic entrants. These networks are in charge of taking care of 
“core supporters”.  
 
Clientelism is pervasive in poor countries suggesting that this two-sided relationship is 
more likely to occur with asymmetric exchangers. Whereas the politician (patron) uses 
his/her higher status, power or resources to gather political support, the voter (client) finds 
the patron’s favors beneficial most of the times. In this regard, clientelism poses a serious 
barrier to political competition in which challengers must break off the mutually beneficial 
clientelistic relationship and make appealing offers to voters.   
 
Clientelism differs from targeted spending or special-interest groups politics, common also 
in developed countries, because in that exchange voters show certain degree of collective 
action to act as a group and obtain a higher leverage in politician’s strategies
†. In contrast to 
the clientelistic exchange, the asymmetry between politicians and voters is lower and the 
institutional setting may provide some level of enforcement of electoral promises. In this 
setting, the commitment problem is less severe and voters can coordinate on strategies like 
lobbying or retrospective voting to address the political outcome, limit the rent-extraction 
or encourage political competition among candidates.   
 
Thus, clientelism blooms in weakly institutionalized environments where citizens face high 
costs  to  coordinate  their  actions  and  politicians  are  poorly  constrained.  Clientelistic 
networks  appear  as  a  mean  to  overcome  voters’  political  mobilization  problems  and 
politicians’ commitment problems insofar as they channel citizens’ demands to meet them 
with politicians’ supply. In this line of reasoning, Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) show how 
                                                 
† Piattoni (2001) points out that the electorate at the lowest level of aggregation of 





patronage  networks  can  bring  more  efficient  policies  than  those  obtained  under 
retrospective voting and total lack of commitment. 
 
However,  clientelism  and  interest-groups  politics  –or  targeted  spending,  belong  to  the 
realm of particularistic/redistributive politics. Some scholars identify clientelism with the 
entire realm allowing certain degree of organization among clients whereby they obtain 
favors from politicians who could be punished and made accountable although imperfectly. 
Others like Robinson and Verdier (2003) define it as “a style of redistributive politics”. Yet, 
a  country  could  have  a  mixture  of  both  of  these  phenomena  at  different  levels  of 
government or regional districts such that a clear distinction between “pure clientelism” and 
interest-group politics  becomes dubious. The institutional  context  ultimately  determines 
how pervasive particularistic politics is by setting the constraints for political competition, 
collective action and accountability.  
 
2.1.2 Literature Review on Clientelism/Redistributive Politics 
 
Clientelism  has  been  the  object  of  study  of  initially  anthropologists  and  then  political 
scientists. There is an abundant literature mainly based on case studies. See Piatonni ed., 
2001; Shaffer ed., 2007, and Kitschelt and Wilkinson, ed., 2007. In general, this literature 
does not include formal models but an exception is Geddes (1998), Medina and Stokes 
(2002) and Medina (2007). The last two references conceptualize clientelism as political 
monopoly.  
 
A renewed interest on this phenomena emerged since 1990s due to a perceived resurgence 
of particularistic politics. Recent studies point out the resilience of clientelism before social 
transformations in developing countries. The surveys of Roniger (2004) and Stokes (2007) 
provide the main insights of a literature characterized by little attempts to systematize and 
operationalize the concept of clientelism. Consequently, the agreement over what could be 
seen  as  clientelism  as  well  as  empirical  measures  to  do  cross-country  comparisons  is 
meager.   
 
Although the intrinsic difficulty in measuring an activity that is secluded from public eyes, 
the patron-brokerage networks can be tracked. Trotta (2003) and Stokes (2007) suggest 
studying  not  only  the  dyadic  relationship  between  the  patron  and  client,  but  also  the 
strategic links between party leaders, party brokers and voters. Empirically it has been 
found  that  clientelist  parties  are  greatly  decentralized.  This  approach  enriches  the 
understanding  of  political  strategies  and  measures  how  much  intermediation  a  party 
develops to effectively capture voters. Studies on such networks are found in Argentina 
(Auyero 1997, 2000; Torres 2002), Colombia (Martz 1997, Sudarsky 2001, Rubio 2003; 
Durán-García 2000), Mexico (Magaloni 2007) and Brazil (Lanna 1995).  
 
Instead of focusing on the muddy notion of clientelism, economists have preferred to study 
the more clear-cut problem of redistributive politics of targeted and excludable benefits to 
gather electoral support. This has been done in an ideal democratic setting –accountability, 
perfect information, symmetry of agents. Models of electoral competition and legislative 
bargaining  explain  how  office-seeking  politicians  choose  their  political  platforms  when 





Tabellini (2000) lay out the standard framework of two identical parties that commit to 
their  electoral  promises  and  voters  able  to  coordinate  their  intra-group  actions.  In  this 
framework, the policy platforms/choices depend on the relative strength of groups either 
based on their large amount of swing voters, ideological leanings or lobbying capacity. The 




Analysis of pure redistribution that abstract from public goods and rent-extraction, like Cox 
and McCubbins(1986) and Dixit and Londregan(1996,1998) incorporate the notion of 
“machine politics”. In this scenario, groups of voters have ideological affinities and parties 
are able to target their supporters.  Core supporters could be seen as the result of repeated 
interactions of clientelistic exchanges, however these authors take that machine politics as 
exogenous leaving it as a black box. 
 
Models that explicitly introduce clientelism as a direct and individual political exchange 
between  candidates  and  voters  in  a  no  commitment  context  are  scarce.  Robinson  and 
Verdier (2003) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) are the main references. The former provides 
a  formalization  of  patronage  based  on  a  modified  version  of  the  probabilitistic  voting 
model.  The  main  contributions  of  their  papers  are  to  formalize  the  self-enforcement 
character of the clientelistic exchange and to show how the redistribution that takes place in 
the form of patronage provides incentives to distort the investment in public goods bringing 
inefficiencies in redistribution. This happens because the clientelistic incumbent hurts the 
credibility of his own offer and enhances the entrant’s chances of winning by providing 
public  goods.  In  addition,  these  authors  show  that  patronage  is  a  relatively  attractive 
political strategy when the productivity is below a threshold level. The model is insightful 
to analyze patronage although simplifies too much the nature of the political competition, 
the budget allocation problem and the potential conflict between clients and non-clients.  
 
Keefer  and  Vlaicu  (2008)  analyze  the  effect  of  politicians’  strategies  in  managing  the 
credibility of their electoral promises on the fiscal policy outcomes. They aim at explaining 
differences in fiscal policies in democracies by highlighting candidates’ cost of building 
political credibility. They also use the probabilistic voting model in which two symmetric 
candidates  could  either  pay  the  costs  of  mobilizing  voters  and  develop  credible 
relationships  with  them  or  hire  a  patron-client  network  which  guarantees  politicians’ 
campaign promises as well as voters’ electoral support. Here patron-client relationships are 
forged  independently  of  political  considerations  and  outside  the  dynamics  of  political 
competition.  Patrons  are  simple  intermediaries  that  can  be  hired  at  the  highest  bidder 
represented by targeted spending.  
 
In line with the literature on redistributive politics, these authors find that the reliance on 
patrons  bias  the  policy  toward  targeted  spending  and  against  public  good  provision. 
However,  the  use  of  patron-client  networks  introduces  additional  policy  ills  because  it 
causes delayed political development. This happens because political competitors ignore 
                                                 
‡ Persson and Tabellini (2000) comment on authors that consider the case of informed and 
uninformed voters and they develop a model of redistributive politics with rent-extraction 





the direct organization of voters, who never believe in politicians and prefer to stay in deals 
with patrons, whose interest are far from promoting general welfare-enhancing policies.  As 
a result, the collective action problem of voters prevents from selecting good politicians, 
thus placing a brake on the institutionalization of democratic competition.  
 
In summary these two theoretical exercises point out a well-known fact about clientelism as 
a style of redistributive politics, which is the undersupply of public goods because patrons 
find  targeting  spending/rewarding  more  effective  for  electoral  support.  Robinson  and 
Verdier (2003) indicate that clientelism tends to be worse in situations when productivity is 
low and patronage is attractive to poor agents. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) highlight that 
clientelism is associated with low degrees of political coordination among voters. Then, it 
is a politicians’ strategy of political mobilization of a poorly organized electorates. In both 
articles clientelism and poverty (or high income inequality) and underdevelopment have a 
direct relationship.  
 
These authors aim at disclosing poverty/development traps. While in Robinson and Verdier 
(2003) it is a low level of productivity and high inequality which sustains into office a 
patron interested in keeping agents poor, in Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) it is politicians’ lack 
of  credibility  and  their  reliance  on  patron-client  networks  which  delays  the  process  of 
democratic maturity. In such process, voters and politicians would overcome the problem 
of accountability and correct the bias against general welfare-enhancing policies.  
These  insights  suggest  two  fronts  of  actions  to  exit  the  poverty  trap.  On  one  hand, 
improving the productivity of the economy and reducing the degree of inequality would 
diminish the patron’s leverage and increase the incentives to provide public goods. On the 
other hand, establishing mechanisms to overcome the credibility problem of politicians and 
suppressing distorting intermediaries between citizens and politicians would improve the 
selection  of  better  politicians.  One  decade  of  economic  and  political  reforms  in  Latin 
American,  the  promising  1990s,  along  these  policy  lines,  proved  the  resilience  of 
clientelism and the limited understanding of reformers.   
 
It is clear that important aspects of clientelism have not been sufficiently studied. The main 
question is how clientelism threats democracy and thus development. Intuitively, it does so 
“by sliding into what could be defined as „systemic corruption‟, crippling institutional trust 
and public confidence in the political system and in projects that otherwise could empower 
citizens” (Roniger 2003, p. 20). In this line, Stokes (2007) points out the little research on 
the institutional causes and consequences of clientelism. Furthermore, she indicates that 
“Much theoretical work and empirical research remain to be done. The affinity between 
inequality  and  clientelism  is  settled  fact,  but  the  mechanisms  linking  the  two,  and  the 
direction of causality are not” (Stokes, p.32).  
 
2.1.3 Main Facts on Clientelism in Latin America 
 
Three facts greatly connected to clientelism are reported in this section: 1.Pervasiveness of 
corruption; 2. Vote buying, and 3. Resilient clientelism.  
 
 





A. Pervasiveness of Corruption 
 
Corruption is simply defined as “the abuse of public power for private benefit” and takes 
various forms
§.  Corruption can be thought as a proxy variable of clientelistic politics, 
however it is important to clarify that not all corrupted acts  are connected to clientelism. 
Corruption can happen simply because of weak rule of law. 
 
Clientelism brings about corruption insofar as it diverts public resources or public rights to 
sustain clientelistic politicians into power as well as their army of br okers. This political 
strategy entails an agency problem for patrons. Once appointed in a public sector position 
or secured in an intermediate link of the patron-network, clients could divert resources for 
themselves. However, such diversion may not be perceived as related to political strategies 
of candidates to stay in office. Here in lies the difficulty  in distinguishing motivations of 
corrupt acts.    
 
The 2007 report of the Latinobarómetro, an opinion survey carried out in Latin America to 
measure citizens’ attitudes and performance of democracy, indicates that the perception of 
corruption has been and still continues being high in the region. A 43% of Latin Americans 
believe  that  there  will  be  more  corruption  in  the  next  generation.  Table  1  shows  the 
incidence of corrupt acts. 
 
 
Table 1. Corrupted Acts 
% of positive answers to the question: Have you, or a relative of yours, 
 heard about a corrupted act in the last twelve months? 
 
    Source: 2007 Latinobarómetro Report 
                                                 
§ “Corruption is sometimes involved in: satisfying regulations and obtaining licenses to 
engage in particular activities (e.g. opening a shop; operating a taxi); land zoning and 
similar official decisions; access to publicly provided goods and services; decisions 
regarding procurement or public investment contracts; control over the provision of tax 
incentives; and hiring and promotion within the public sector” Schneider and Enste (p. 90, 






B. Vote Buying  
 
Another  manifestation  of  clientelism  is  vote  buying.  Surveys  as  Latinobarómetro  and 
Americas  Barometer  include  questions  on  this  practice,  which  is  still  important  in 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Dominican  Republic  and  Ecuador.  Systematic  analysis  of 
these data needs to be done yet. A rough idea on this phenomenon can be drawn from the 
Colombian case shown in graph 1. Thus, according to the 2007 Americas Barometer report 
on  Colombia,  16.4%  of  the  surveyed  people  said  they  received  a  monetary  reward  in 
exchange for their vote. The percentage increases to 17.4% when a friend of the surveyed 
was  made  such  offer.  The  regions  with  the  highest  percentage  of  vote  buying  include 
Bogotá, the capital district, where the electorate concentrates and two regions which have 
been historically perceived as very clientelistic. Unsurprisingly, these regions are among 




Graph 1. Vote Buying in Colombia by regions, 2007 
 
      Source: Rodríguez and Seligson, 2007.  
 
 
C. Resilient Clientelism 
 
The 1990s saw a wave of political reformism in the region. Nonetheless, clientelism was 
resilient to these transformations. The reforms were meant to democratize the system in 
those  countries  with  autocratic  regimes  or  hindered  political  competition  as  well  as 
introduce more adequate rules to improve accountability, fight corruption and encourage 
citizens’ political participation. Some of the constitutional reforms took place in  Brazil 
1988, Argentina 1994, Colombia 1991, Peru 1993 and Ecuador 1998.   
 
Studies on Clientelism as Gay (1998) and Trotta (2003) among others, find a change in the 





traditional/thick  patron-client  relationships  to  a  more  dynamic  broker/thin  relationships. 
Overall, the traditional form was characterized by less intermediation and more asymmetry, 
stability and durability of the patron-client ties which were individually settled. In contrast, 
the broker form moves toward the opposite characteristics of the traditional form, thus 
establishing a more pragmatic relationship between clients and brokers. Here clients could 
act through “clientelist associations” instead of acting on individual stands. However, the 
broker patronage relies more heavily on the distribution of state resources and rights than 
traditional patronage. In Colombia, some evidence shows that more horizontal but short-
lived relationships between patrons and clients intensify the competition between patrons. 
As a result, the post-reform scenario was characterized by high party fragmentation and 
instable coalitional politics (Gutierrez 2004).       
 
The difficulties in understanding the resilience of clientelism comes from “a major tension 
of modern democratic polities, which are built on citizenship and political equality but 
leave  the  economic  domain  open  to  inequalities  and  substantial  socioeconomic  gaps” 
(Roniger 2003, p.20). The next section focuses on one source of such gap. 
 
 
2.2 The Notion of Informality 
 
  
Informality  refers  to  the  non  compliance  of  workers  or  firms  with  labor  and  business 
regulations.  It  refers  to  the  economic  activity  that  takes  place  outside  the  fiscal  and 
regulatory control of the state and as such it is an indicator of state enforcement. It is refers 
to the shadow or underground economy whose output is legal but its activity has a degree 
of illegality
**.   
 
Despite the difficulties in measuring Informality, in 1993 the first international definition of 
Informality for statistical purposes was agreed. Yet, there are different measures. The first 
focuses on the absent of social security coverage of informal independent workers and 
informal salaried workers. The second looks at the characteristics of productive units and 










                                                 
** It is important to note that the informal sector is a subset of the entire illegal activities. 
The underground economy is relatively identifiable by its non-participation in labor or 
business regulation and can be surveyed. Other illegal economic activities comprise more 
serious non-compliance –e.g. drug smuggling. Naturally, informal business and more 





Table 2. Definitions of Informality and Latin American Average (2005-2006) 
 
Definition  Criteria  Details  Regional 
Average  
Legalistic   No registration of 
salaried relationship 
with social security  
a. Independent workers (self-employed 
professionals, artisans, handymen, 
construction laborers, taxi drivers and street 
vendors) 
b. salaried workers (domestic employees, 
unpaid family workers, microfirm workers, 







(% of total 
urban 
employment) 
Productive units  Unregistered small 
business units 
i) Informal own-account enterprises that 
occasionally employ family workers or 
employees 
ii) enterprises of informal employers which 
are small in size  and/or registered 
themselves or their workers  
 
54.5% (% of 
workers) 
Sources: Perry et al. (2007), OECD (2008). 
 
 
This segmentation of labor and productive markets has been seen as the result of two main 
reasons.  Firstly,  because  of  voluntary  “exit”  of  workers  and  firms,  who  find  the  state 
regulatory framework burdensome and of little value. Secondly, due to the involuntary 
“exclusion” of low-income, unskilled workers or rural workers who don’t have access to 
fundamental state benefits.   
 
 
2.2.1 Literature Review on Informality  
 
Informality can be seen as a more updated version of the dual economy concept developed 
by Lewis in the 1960s. Dualism refers to the coexistence of traditional and modern sectors. 
The former can mean either the agricultural sector, rural production or more broadly, the 
use of older-techniques of production that are labor intensive and forms of organization 
based on family as opposed to wage labor in which output is distributed in the form of 
shares that accrue to each family member. The latter can mean either industrial sector, 
urban production, or in general the use of modern and capital intensive technology, wage 
labor and profit-seeking activities. (Ray 1998, p. 354). Formal and informal sectors draw 
upon the idea of segmentation in the economy with important differences in technology and 
relationships between the production factors and with the state. The emergence of an urban 
informal sector was seen as a consequence of delayed economic modernization which could 
not absorb the labor force that moved from rural to urban areas in search of higher wages.  
 
However, the picture of duality was greatly enriched from the 1960s to the 1990s, now 
showing a very dynamic and highly heterogeneous informal sector. As was seen in the 
previous section, Informality comprises poor excluded workers as well as low and middle-
income  small  businessmen  and  self-employed  workers  who  deliberately  stay  informal. 
According to recent empirical evidence, a driving force in Informality is the “exit” reason. 





institutions of the state, depending on their valuation of the net benefits associated with 
Formality and the state‟s enforcement effort and capability” (Perry et. al., 2007, p.2). The 
exit  choice  causes  the  exclusion  form  to  some  extent  because  when  businesses  move 
toward Informality, their employees end up excluded from the supply of state services. 
 
There  have  been  models  aiming  to  explain  business’  choices  between  Formality  and 
Informality in order to understand their incentives and determine more efficient regulatory 
frameworks. A complete review can be found in Schneider and Enste (2000). Overall, the 
size of the informal sector has been explained firstly by high or inadequate taxation, and 
secondly by the business and labor regulatory framework, the level of enforcement against 
informal  firms  and  country’s  institutional  quality.  Specifically,  tax  evasion  and  tax 
avoidance have been received a great attention in this literature in which the institutional 
setting and the quality of regulation are taken as exogenous and the economic reasoning 
dominates. 
 
Given the persistence of the phenomenon, the World Bank and other development agencies 
have thoroughly studied the phenomenon. In their view, a large informal sector delays 
development because it is characterized by low aggregate productivity coming from small 
scale of activity, low technology, and rigid constrains on human capital accumulation and 
credit  access.  It  also  reinforces  poverty  as  workers  go  unprotected  from  health  and 
employment shocks and lack old-age security. Loayza (1996) finds supporting evidence of 
this negative view of the informal sector in many Latin American countries in the early 
1990s.  However, Schneider and Enste  (2000)  report that, in  general,  the effects of the 
informal economy on economic growth remain ambiguous. This is because the informal 
sector also brings a dynamic entrepreneurial spirit whose voluntarily self-selection between 
the formal and informal sector introduces a flexible response to the business cycle and 
constraints  on  bad  government  though  by  opting  out  instead  of  voicing.  One  possible 
explanation  of  this  ambiguity  could  lie  in  varying  levels  of  income  inequality  and 
institutional quality across countries.  
 
As for income inequality, other studies (i.e. Chong and Gradstein, 2007) found a positive 
correlation  with  Informality,  after  controlling  for  level  of  development  and  other 
institutional characteristics. However, the endogeneity between inequality and Informality 
via institutions makes difficult to identify the effect of inequality on Informality from the 
effect of institutional variables-i.e. low public spending in education feeds inequality but 
most of the unskilled workers stay in the informal sector. The World Bank report says 
“more analysis is needed to understand better how the institutional setting may affect the 
channel through which inequality affects Informality” (Perry et al., 2007, p. 239).  
 
Related to institutional quality, differences in corruption run parallel to differences in the 
size of the informal sectors across countries. Several authors provide empirical evidence on 
the direct correlation between corruption and larger shadow economies, thus pointing the 
complementary between these two phenomena (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón, 
1998; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoidó-Lobaton, 1999).  
 
In emphasizing on institutions, the World Bank states that Informality can be seen as a 





and poorly resolved social tensions lead to agents to opt out the formal system. At the 
bedrock of the social contract is tax compliance which is the fundamental social exchange 
between citizens and the state (Perry et al., Ibid., p. 228). To the extent that workers and 
micro-entrepreneurs who opt out the formal system and evade taxes, the effectiveness of 
public expenditure and social service provision is severely constrained. Firstly, because of 
the state is financially limited as this reduces its ability to provide public goods. Secondly, 
because of the exit choice relaxes citizens’ attitudes on the checks and constraints that 
political  agents  must  comply  with.  As  a  result,  inefficiencies  and  corruption  in  state 
services are encouraged by a culture of non-participation and non-compliance. It follows 
that the growth of the informal sector brings about a development trap. 
 
In this literature policymaking plays an important role in overcoming this trap. Formal 
models’  insights  focus  on  better  design  of  social  security  systems  and  regulatory 
environments  to  modify  agents’  incentives.  In  addition,  developmental  agencies 
recommend major improvements in the quality and fairness of state institutions and policies 
to defeat the culture of noncompliance. Naturally, tax reforms have been at the very heart 
of economic reform packages.  
 
Overall, Informality has been modeled leaving aside the political dimension. Yet, the truth 
is that agents, when making decisions on staying formal or informal, choose based not only 
on  a  cost-benefit  analysis  but  also  on  their  perceptions  and  expectations  about  the 
performance  of  the  political  system.  Although  the  literature  has  acknowledged  the 
importance of this dimension, the central question on the mechanisms linking the decision 
of being formal or informal to the political context remains unanswered.  
 
 
2.2.2 Facts on Informality in Latin America 
 
A. Informality Increase in the 1990s  
 
The World  Bank in  its  2007 report  found distressing increases  in  Informality  in  many 
countries of the region over the 1990s. Graph 2 shows the incidence of  Informality by 
countries. Bolivia and Paraguay have more than 70% of the labor force in the informal 
sector (productive definition) whereas this figure for Chile and Costa Rica is about 40%. In 





















    Source: Latin American Economic Outlook 2009, OECD 
 
 
The immediate causes of this increase are: 1.) sharp increases in real minimum wages in 
some  countries,  2).  changes  in  labor  market  and  social  security  legislation,  increased 
availability of noncontributory social protection schemes for informal workers, 3.) poorly 
designated  social  security  systems  that  tax  heavily  workers  in  the  formal  sector,  4). 
inadequate  macroeconomic  policies  that  led  to  artificial  booms  in  nontradable,  which 




B. Low Tax Morale and Tax Collection  
 
The  World  Bank  reports  that  Informality  (after  controlling  for  per  capita  income)  is 
negatively  correlated  with  tax  morale  –society’s  disposition  toward  tax  compliance. 
Citizens’ beliefs and perceptions of government’s performance and the quality of public 
spending  influence  their  tax  compliance  which  is  not  only  a  matter  of  deterrence 
mechanisms. Surveys show that in Latin America the low confidence of its citizens in the 
state as to enforce the law is outstanding when compared to the same attitudes of citizens of 
other emerging regions. Also, there is a strong perception that the state is weak and does 
not respond to the interest of the majority. Thus, “countries with high Informality tend to be 
those where the social norm is not conducive to complying with tax regulations” (Perry et 
al., Ibid, p.232). 
 
Low tax morale entails low tax collection. Tax revenues in the region remain below the 
international norm because of undertaxation of income, wealth and property. The bulk of 
taxation remains on indirect over domestic and internationally traded goods and services. 





capacity of tax administration, narrow tax bases and excessive exemptions. In regard to the 
latter the World Bank reports that: 
 
“personal exemptions levels increased from an average of 60 percent of GDP per capita in 
1985 to 230 percent in 2003 (an unusually high level by international standards), and the 
income  levels  taxed  at  maximum  rates  (the  cutoff  for  the  upper-income  bracket)  were 
lowered sharply” (Perry et al., 2007, p. 225). 
 
This  means  that  the  rich  pay  a  much  larger  share  of  taxes  than  their  counterparts  in 
developed countries. As for social spending it is characterized by patterns of regressivity 
(i.e.  social  security  in  particular  the  pension  system)  and  important  within-country 
inequities because differences in the quality of access to social services by income groups 
are significant.   
 
 
C. High Costs of Formality  
 
The decision of being informal or formal depends on the costs of Formality, which are 
relatively high for the region. According to OECD’ estimations, to start running a medium 
size  firm  requires  twice  as  many  hours/number  of  payments  in  Latin  America  than  in 
OECD countries. Table 3 illustrates that countries like Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, 
and Ecuador require an alarmingly huge amount of time to start a business while countries 
like Colombia, Dominican Republic and Ecuador need a large number of payments to do 





Table 3. The Costs of Compliance in Latin America and OECD countries
 
    Source: OECD, 2008, p.154 
 
 
2.3 Clientelism and Informality: Research Niche 
 
At this point, the previous discussion must suggest that clientelism and Informality have a 
double-way  relationship  interacting  through  the  quality  of  institutions  that  they  jointly 
structure. On one hand, a symptom of clientelistic politics is found in large and inefficient 
burocracies,  and  state  corruption  which  translate  into  high  opportunity  cost  of  tax 
compliance  and  business  regulation  observance  for  citizens.  In  this  line  of  reasoning, 
clientelism encourages Informality. On the other hand, Informality makes economic agents 
interested in working outside the formal sector (in its “exit” side). This creates incentives to 
vote  for  politicians  that  obtain  electoral  support  based  not  on  policy  platforms  or 





rationally explained by the lack of credibility of such broad interest promises in a context of 
low institutional quality. In this line of reasoning Informality encourages clientelism.  
 
This research project aims at throwing light on the mechanisms that link these phenomena 
frequently linked to development traps. In particular, I focus on the interactions between 
clientelism and Informality in electoral competition. The general objective is to provide an 
analytical framework to understand the underlying mechanisms of electoral competition in 
developing countries. This competition is characterized by asymmetries between politicians 
(credibility and ability to mobilize voters) and asymmetries between voters (income and 
participation  in  a  certain  segment  of  the  economy)  amidst  an  environment  of  low 
institutional quality (i.e. low rule of law). The specific objective is to provide empirical 
evidence on these mechanisms for some Latin American countries.   
 
By focusing on electoral competition, I explore the intuition that clientelism could depress 
political competition. Thus, elements as the supply of politicians/parties, entry barriers and 
biases in electoral strategies that entrants face when contesting clientelistic incumbents are 
examined. Political competition is defined as the degree of contestability in the political 
exchange  among  citizens  and  politicians  and  among  politicians
††.   To  the  extent  that 
political competition is hindered, popular sovereignty is meaningless. Apathy in politics 
and  politicians  due  to  the  lack  of  better/credible  candidates  is  symptomatic  of  Latin 
Americans’  disappointment  with  the  unfulfilled  promises  of  democracy  as  well  as  the 
subsequent  political  instability  of  some  of  the  most  vulnerable  countries  in  the  region. 
Mechanisms that encourage “high-quality” political competition would pave a sounder way 
to development.  
 
By  bringing  Informality  into  the  picture,  I  investigate  under  which  conditions  a  dual 
economy sustains clientelistic politicians in office. In this way, the economic incentives and 
conflict among the demand side of politics, that is, voters are enriched. Informality in its 
“exit” side has been studied as an economic choice in a context of low state enforcement 
and  low  tax  morale.  Thus,  the  political  dimension  of  Informality  has  been  exogenous 
limiting our understanding on the persistence and complexity of the problem. The decision 
of being informal or formal has a political dimension insufficiently stressed and explored. 
Agents are not only workers or businessmen but also voters that select politicians whose 
actions shape institutions and affect their welfare. Emphasizing this side of the political 
exchange would highlight individually rational but collectively harmful attitudes of Latin 
American citizens before their development traps. As Hirschman noted, “confronted with a 
lack of voice in and relevance of the state, Latin Americans take their business elsewhere; 
and in doing this, they further undermine the region’s growth prospect” (Perry et al., 2007, 
p.19).  
 
The next section provides a model of electoral competition that captures the interactions 
between  clientelism  and  Informality  in  a  simple  set  up  as  a  starting  point  in  the 
formalization of the problem.  
 
                                                 
†† The IO literature works with the notion of contestable market which is one where “entry 





3. A Static Model of Political Competition with Clientelism and Informality 
 
The following exercise depicts the electoral competition between a clientelistic incumbent 
and an entrant that compete in elections by offering policy platforms in terms of a tax rate 
and public goods. The economy has two groups of voters who operate in a dual economy 
and choose politicians based not only on the utility they derive from their policy platforms 
but also on their ideological leanings towards candidates.  
 
The model draws upon the probabilistic voting model presented by Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) and Robinson and Verdier (2003). In first place, the economic and the political 
settings are developed. In second place, electoral equilbria are considered in two scenarios: 
a clientelistic regime with no entrant and a clientelistic regime with entrant. Finally some 
theoretical insights are provided. 
    
3.1. The Basic Setup 
 
The economic setting 
 
The economy has two sectors, informal and formal. The former is characterized by lower 
productivity and tax evasion whereas the latter has the opposite characteristics. Here only 
the “exit” side of Informality is considered, thus leaving out the “exclusion” side. This 
segmentation introduces an imperfect market economy. 
 
There are two groups of voters, denoted by J=1,2 that are producers-consumers. Each group 
has  a  population  share    ,  and  it  is  assumed  that         ,  with  ∑      .  Income  is 
exogenous and identical for each individual intra-group. Income inter-group is such that 
        The average income is  (    )     for all J.  
 
Citizen i has quasi-linear preferences over private consumption    and a publicly provided 
good g. His utility is, 
 
                                (1) 
 
Where H(g) is a concave and monotonically increasing function common to all citizens. 
The variable g is a pure public good measured in terms of spending per capita.  
 
A non-distorting common tax rate is levied on all citizens, where          . Then,  
 
  
             
                   (2) 
 
Citizens  can  move  between  sectors  although  they  should  pay  a  cost  when  doing  so. 
Informal agents that move to the formal sector must pay taxes whereas formal agents that 
opt out the system evade taxes but suffer a proportionate loss of income equal to      
      so that their income becomes     
  in the informal sector, where            .  This 





potential fines she must pay in case of being detected for tax evasion. As individuals are 
equal intra-group the subscript I is dropped. 
 
Citizens in group one remain formal if the following participation constraint holds, 
 




                                (4) 
 
Equation (4) is called the Formality constraint which sets a maximum to the tax rate so as 
to prevent formal agents with the highest income to become informal. It is assumed that 
       because for this group the productivity gap between sectors is important and it is 
more difficult to evade taxes without being detected. 
 
Citizens  in  group  two  have  two  contrasting  characteristics.  First,  they  face  no  serious 
income loss when moving toward the informal sector, that is        . This assumption 
reflects group two’s relatively low productivity gap and its low probability of detection for 
tax evasion.  
 
Second, once they are in the informal sector, they can enter into a clientelistic relationship 
with  the  incumbent  politician.  Here,  informal  voters  and  politicians  exchange  “tax 
noncompliance”  wherein  the  voter  bribes  the  incumbent  to  obtain  either  low  level  of 
prosecution from tax authorities or significant tax exemptions.  
 
A citizen in group two opts out the formal system if, 
 
                                           (5) 
 
Where  ε  is  the  efficiency  of  the  incumbent  in  securing  client’s  non-compliance  and 
         . If ε=0 the incumbent is totally effective in providing safe noncompliance (zero 
tax  payment  or  maximum  tax  exemption).  If  ε≈1  the  incumbent  has  poor  capacity  to 
protect/create non-compliers. In this simplified setup, ε is exogenous although set by the 
incumbent. This parameter reflects the ability to manipulate tax rules as a low ε signals that 
politicians “trade” tax-related institutions to obtain private benefits. A high ε can reflect 
sound rule of law and high tax morale that set effective constrains on politicians willing to 
trade on these public goods.  A more interesting analysis would endogenize this parameter.  
From this point on, ε is referred as the tax exemption factor.  
 
The function ψ(b) denotes client’s cost for safe non-compliance. This function depends on 
the  bribes  the  citizen  pays  to  the  incumbent,  where       .  This  function  is  bounded, 
                convex and continuous. 





For the sake of simplification it is assumed that voters in group one, the richer citizens, 
cannot be clients. This can be thought as the result of large opportunity costs of tax evasion 
since bribes would be too high given the high probability of detection for this group
‡‡. 
 
Richer individuals want a smaller government because proportional taxes  imply that they 
pay a larger share of the tax burden. The clientelistic exchange exacerbates this policy 
conflict between the two groups of  citizens since tax evasion  means a larger transfer of 
income via public goods provision from voters in group one to voters in group two.    
 
The Political Setting  
 
There are two politicians, an incumbent and an entrant, denoted by P=I, E. Incumbent is a 
clientelistic politician whose credibility hinges on his network of brokers and can set a tax 
exemption factor less than one, ε<1. Although only voters in group two can become clients, 
Incumbent’s political platform is credible to all voters. Entrant has no clients and needs to 
build her credibility (ε=1).  All this is common knowledge and information is complete.  
 
 
The Clientelistic Exchange (CE) 
 
This exchange exists as long as it is self-enforcing for both sides: the voter in group two 
and  Incumbent.  The  voter finds the deal  with  Incumbent beneficial if  her participation 
constrain, that is equation (5), is slack. However, Incumbent faces a moral hazard problem 
because  the  client  can  renege  on  his  part  of  the  contract  by  not  paying  the  bribe  but 
benefiting from the tax exemption. Assume that there is a probability q that Incumbent’s 
network  catches  the  cheating  client,  in  which  case,  the  client  is  denounced  before  tax 
authorities and has to pay the full tax rate plus fines, denoted by f.  The probability that 
Incumbent’s network does not reach the client who becomes a free-rider is (1-q). Hence, 
the client pays off Incumbent if, 
 
                                         (             )   
 
The left hand side of this shows client’s net income while the right hand side shows the 
expected income if he stays in the informal sector but do not bribe the politician. Given that 
individuals in group two has no serious income loss from being informal, then fines are 
assumed to be zero (f=0). To simplify this setup, also assume that q=1, which indicates that 
Incumbent’s network solved the free-riders problem and the previous equation takes the 
form of equation (5).   
 
Incumbent can make credible promises of safe tax noncompliance as long as the following 
participation constraint holds on his side, 
 
                                                 
‡‡ Clearly, a more complete scenario would allow richer citizens be clients, in that case, 
their bribes would equate to lobby for tax exemptions. This is a possibility not far from 





                               (6) 
 
The clientelistic exchange occurs whenever the rents, R(b), that Incumbent extracts from 
his clients through bribes exceed the costs of providing tax exemptions. These costs are 
positive and paid by Incumbent’s wealth. R(b) is assumed continuous and concave with b 
exogenous.  
 
Equation (5) amounts to a constraint for the tax rate given by, 
 
    
       
                       (7) 
 
The clientelistic exchange is feasible if and only if the range to set taxes, set by equations 
(4) and (7), holds,  
 
    
       
                             (8) 
 
This expression is called the clientelistic feasibility constraint. Note that when         
    
       
 , Incumbent is not able to set a tax rate such that voters in group one stay formal and 
at the same time voters in group two stay informal. In this case            and clientelism 
is not feasible. Unfeasibility could be explained either by large values of bribes paid by 
clients or a tax exemption factor close to one in an economy with very low costs of moving 
from the formal to the informal sector.   
 
Timing  of  the  game  is  as  follows.  (1)  Incumbent  sets  ε;  (2)  Incumbent  and  Entrant 
announce their policy platforms              ; (3) Popularity shock occurs; (4) Election 
are  held;  (5)  The  winner  implements  his/her  policy  and  production,  taxation  and 
consumption takes place. 
 
3.2. Electoral Equilibria 
 
Case 1: Clientelistic Regime without Entrant: Political Monopoly  
 
In  this  scenario,  voters  in  group  two  and  Incumbent  find  the  clientelistic  exchange 
beneficial  (equation  (6)  is  slack  and  equation  (8)  holds).  Incumbent  runs  uncontested 
because Entrant has no means to build her credibility.  
 
Incumbent sets taxes by solving the following problem, 
 
   
 
         
 
s.t.  
    
       
             
 





Under political monopoly tax revenues are reduced by the proportion ε thereby shortening 
the provision of public goods. The optimal tax rate under political monopoly is denoted by 
  . 
 
Case 2: Clientelistic Regime with Entrant 
 
Although Incumbent’s network of brokers is incentive-compatible for both parts, Entrant is 
able to build credibility so as to capture votes. For simplicity assumed that credibility is 
exogenously determined. A more complete analysis should include the costs of achieving 
binding electoral promises.   
 
Any feasible policy must satisfy the government balanced constraint. However, Incumbent 
and Entrant do not face the same constraint for Incumbent raises lower taxes than Entrant. 
The budget constraints are,  
 
     {  (               )       
          
            (9) 
 
Where (    )     , for all J. The term             is negative indicating the dissipation 
effect brought by the clientelistic exchange. 
 
Voters’ indirect utility on policy preferences are denoted by         for J=1,2 and p=I,E. 
Neither  Entrant  nor  Incumbent  can  imitate  each  other  because  voters  have  complete 
information about their types. Consequently, the optimal policy platforms of each candidate 
can diverge.   
 
Substituting Entrant’s budget constraint into         gives,  
 
          (       )             for J=1,2          (10) 
 
The bliss point of voters from Entrant’s platform is given by 
 
   






By concavity of H(.), this expression implies that the tax rate preferred by each group is 
decreasing  in    .  Voters  in  group  one  want  lower  taxes  than  voters  in  group  2,  then 
   
       
  . 
 
Now, let’s consider Incumbent’s situation. Substituting Incumbent’s budget constraint into 
the indirect utility of group one gives, 
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For group two these functions are, 
 
                          (   (               ))             (12) 
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The following graphs illustrate how these four indirect utility functions relate to each other 
as well as their bliss points for τ. Dotted lines indicate utilities obtained with Entrant’s 
budget constraint, and solid lines indicate those under Incumbent’s budget constraint. Thin 






The  graph  1.a  shows  the  two  utility  functions  that  Entrant  faces.  There  it  is  true  that  
   
       
  . Graph 1.b and 1.c shows these utilities for the incumbent in two cases: for low 
and high ε respectively. When Incumbent is very effective (low ε) clients prefer a higher 
tax rate relative to non-clients, that is    
       
  . When ε is high the relative tax preference 





rate when ε is low, clientelistic voters would receive a larger “indirect transfer” from voters 
in  group  one.  Likewise,  lower  effectiveness  to  evade  taxes  reduces  such  transfer  and 
increases client’s tax burden.  
 
Graph 1.d. shows the set of all four indirect utilities stemming from Entrant and Incumbent 
platforms when ε is low. It can be seen that Entrant’s platform gives a higher utility to 
voters in group one than Incumbent’s because the burden of taxation is lower in the absence 
of tax reductions to group two. Logically, Incumbent’s platform is relatively more attractive 
to voters in group two providing that clients’ costs, ψ(b), do not offset the utility gains from 
a low value of ε.  
 
However,  the  nature  of  the  political  competition  in  elections  hinges  not  only  on  these 
utilitarian considerations but also on the relative weight of each group of voters. The weight 
is determined by population shares and ideological densities. Following the probabilistic 
voting model framework, a voter in group J supports Incumbent if,  
 
                            
 
    is an individual-specific parameter that measures voter i’s ideological leaning toward 
Entrant. This parameter can take on negative as well as positive values; when         , 
voters have a positive ideological bias for Incumbent.  This parameter has group-specific 




   
 
 
   
], where        
 
Each group has members inherently biased toward both candidates. A high value of    
means  a  high  ideological  density.  The  parameter  δ  represents  the  aggregate  Entrant’s 
popularity, where higher values indicate more acceptance from the electorate; it can take 




   
 
  +, where h    
 
The realized value of δ is not known by the candidates until the election takes place, which 
introduces uncertainty in the results.  
 
Given the distributional assumptions on    , each politicians calculate their vote share in 
each group, denoted by     , 
 
        [                     ]  
 
             (13) 
 
The expression into brackets corresponds to the swing voter in group J. Clearly, entrant’s 
vote share in group J is given by          . These shares are random variables that depend 
on the relative popularity of candidates. The total vote shares of each politician is     






Using the distributional assumptions on δ, Incumbent´s probability of winning is, 
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 [∑     [                 ]   ]      (14) 
 
Where     ∑         is the average density across groups.  
 
The probability of winning is a smooth function of the distance between the two platforms 
and can be seen as  a  weighted social  welfare function. Candidates  choose their policy 
platforms by maximizing the probability of winning subject to the specific constraints they 
face.  However  candidates  have  different  technologies  to  obtain  electoral  support.  This 
asymmetry between candidates brings two maximization problems into the scenario.  
 
Using the indirect’s utility functions of voters in each group, Incumbent’s problem is to 
maximize his expected net rents. The problem is stated as, 
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Subject to,       
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The last expression is positive iff  
   
      , which happens for sufficiently low values of ε 
and ψ(b). The derivative of Incumbent’s rents with respect to the tax rate is always positive, 
  
      . This points out that a higher tax rate increases Incumbent’s possibilities to provide 
tax exemptions to his clients, who in turn pay bribes that increase his rents.  
 
Entrant’s problem is to maximize her probability of winning,  
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Subject to,                     
 
Candidates maximize their specific weighted social welfare function and choose the tax 
rate. As in a Nash equilibrium, each candidate assumes the opponent’s strategy constant.  





In Entrant’s problem the first order condition shows the optimal trade-off between taxes 
and public goods, which is simply, 
 
∑                                   (16) 
 
The left hand side of this expression indicates the costs of taxation whereas the right hand 
side shows the benefits expressed in terms of consumption of the public good. Hence, 
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Incumbent’s problem stated in equation (15) becomes, 
 
    [      ] 
    
   
  
             
  
 
    
 
Which is equal to, 
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              (18)   
 
Where    and    are the derivatives of H and   with respect to the tax rate,  and   is the 
average density across groups. Note that       , implying that higher taxes go with large 
bribes. The left-hand side of equation (18) shows that the cost of taxation for group two is 
reduced by the tax exemption factor but increased by the cost of bribes. The right-hand side 
indicates that the benefits of taxation are split among the utility from public goods and 
Incumbent’s rents.  
 
Incumbent’s optimal tax rate is given by, 
 
  
      
  (
                   
 (           )  
  
  (           )        )       (19) 
 
An important point here is to note that when       which implies that     , both candidates 
converge to the same platform, so that   
      
 . In this scenario Incumbent and Entrant 
cannot differentiate each other so as to build political clout in any group of voters.  
 
The interesting case happens when ε and ψ(b) are low enough. In this scenario, Incumbent 
count on his clients although he has a clear disadvantage with voters in group one, who 
receive  a  larger  utility  from  Entrant’s  platform.  The  same  is  true  for  Entrant  whose 
disadvantage  lies  in  group  two.  As  can  be  seen  in  equations  (17)  and  (19),  the  best 





aggregate voters’ preferences given their relative advantages. The following sub-cases are 
considered. 
 
Case 2.1.Advantaged Incumbent:            : that group two is denser ideologically 
guarantees more swing voters to Incumbent. Group two does not have strong ideological 
considerations  toward  neither  of  the  candidates  but  their  condition  of  clients  confers 
advantage  to  Incumbent.  Therefore,  Incumbent  enjoys      
 
   whereas  Entrant  faces  a 
negative bias in the probability of winning.  
 
In terms of Graph 1.d., Incumbent’s optimal tax rate,   
  will be closer to    
   , and   
      
 . 
Determining the provision of public goods requires comparing tax revenues collected by 
Entrant and Incumbent, that is   
   vs.   
 (               ). It is clear that for low enough 
ε Incumbent provides less public goods than Entrant only if, 
 
   
            
      
                   (20) 
 
This indicates that the foregone taxation in group two exceeds the difference in tax rates 
imposed on average income. However, the opposite case is also possible.     
 
In comparison with political monopoly, it is intuitive that    
       due to the negative 
effect on the tax rate contributed by voters in group one over the probability of winning. 
 
Case 2.2. Advantaged Entrant:            : Here the entrant enjoys     
 
  based on 
her political clout in group one. Entrant’s optimal tax rate,   
 , is closer to    
  . As in the 
previous case, this tax rate is lower than the rate set by Incumbent   
      
 . The Entrant 
would  provide  less  public  goods  if  the  inequality  in  condition  20  is  reversed.  This 
possibility shows that a higher provision  of public goods  is  not  necessarily  guaranteed 
when Incumbent is kicked out of office. 
 
Case  2.3.  Tied  competition:             :  Here  the  utilitarian  distances  between 
platforms receive the same weights whereby making     
 
  for P=I,E. Hence, there is an 
equal number of swing voters in each group. Let                  so that the average 
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When       thus implying that      , Incumbent’s aggregated bliss point could be larger 
or smaller than Entrant’s. The sign is determined by the level of Incumbent’s rents and 





Incumbent’s rents net of costs are large, then Incumbent sets a relatively higher tax rate, 
  
      
 .  As before, if  condition  20 holds,  Incumbent provides less public goods  than 
Entrant.   
 
 
4.  Discussion of the Model Insights 
 
The classical view of clientelism as political monopoly is considered in case one in which 
the  clientelistic  incumbent  runs  uncontested.  Here,  the  entry  barrier  is  brought  by  the 
entrant’s lack of  credibility.  Suggestive evidence can be seen in  countries  like  Mexico 
before  1997  and  Colombia  during  1957-1978  that  had  one-party  rule  and  pervasive 
clientelism. In these countries high Informality and low tax collection was observed. 
 
Still clientelistic politicians in democracies are more frequently contested. Cases 2.1, 2.2 
and  2.3  capture  this  empirical  fact.  When  the  clientelistic  incumbent  has  electoral 
advantage  due  to  high  concentration  of  swing  voters  within  his  clienteles,  the  entrant 
politician faces an additional barrier to compete, even if she has managed to build some 
credibility. This situation signals an intense demand of voters for the incumbent’s deals 
whereby voters reflect choices based on utilitarian considerations rather than ideological 
leanings. Hence, a large informal sector persists. Countries with multi-party competition 
where the dominant  party is  perceived  as  patronage-based machine are Argentina after 
1982, Brazil after 1988, Colombia after 1978 and 1991 and Dominican Republic after 1961. 
 
In case 2.2. the nonclientelistic entrant has advantage based on the support of richer voters. 
The most important fact to highlight is that by knocking the clientelistic incumbent a higher 
provision of public goods is not necessarily guaranteed. This is because the clientelistic 
exchange is about tax evasion which creates a conflict between voters. When the conflict is 
solved in favor of rich taxpayers, a low equilibrium tax rate could arise relative to taxation 
under political monopoly. However the benefits would be better institutional quality and 
therefore lower Informality. A country that resembles this scenario is Chile after 1990, 
where the center-right wing party won presidential elections after two decades of a right-
wing  dictatorship.  In  this  country  the  perceptions  of  corruption  are  below  the  regional 
average  and  fiscal  institutions  have  been  strengthened  (adoption  of  modern  audit 
technology). There Informality is relatively low although inequality is still high
§§. This case 
suggests that Informality and inequality not necessarily go together and that the quality of 
institutions brings sound rule of law but not always progressive public spending.  
 
In case 2.3 the clientelistic incumbent loses territory in the electoral arena and a non -
clientelist entrant is able to build credibility so that both have the same change of winning 
office.  However  the  results  in  terms  of  each  candidate’s  public  goods  provision  are 
ambiguous. The clientelistic incumbent would provide more public goods if his machine 
                                                 
§§ Certainly the capacity to enforce tax collection as a challenge in the political realm, “a 
matter of political will because the technology is available and administrative capacity 
increases are definitely within the range of options of the much-modernized Latin 





politics is profitable enough and the society is highly unequal. To the extent that the entrant 
politician has her political clout in richer voters that want lower tax rates, the clientelistic 
politician is more progressive in redistributing income.  
 
This positive perception of clientelism has been pointed out by some scholars, i.e. Keefer 
and Vlaicu (2008). Only when the machine politics is too costly, the society will be better 
off with a non-clientelistic entrant. The costs include both the public goods not delivered as 
well as the erosion of institutional quality caused by low law rule of low, tax morale and 
negative perceptions on government’s performance. Both components entrench inequality 
and firmly lock the development trap.  
 
In reality, distinguishing when a non-clientelistic entrant runs for office is difficult because 
she could be initially perceived as independent from extant machine politics but in fact she 
could  imitate  incumbent’s  strategy  and  raise  her  own  clienteles.  Recent  presidential 
elections in Latin America have seen campaigns heavily focused on anti-corruption and 
anti-machine politics (Argentina 1999, Brazil 2002, Colombia after 1991, Ecuador 2006, 
Mexico 1997). Nevertheless, political practices of these entrants seem not to differ much 
from the old practices despite the non-opportunistic motivations that some entrants might 
have.  
 
Political  survival  based  on  clientelism  is  particularly  important  when  the  quality  of 
institutions  has  been  significantly  eroded  by  Incumbents  who  “traded”  enforcement  of 
formal institutions for long time. Thus, the marginal effectiveness of the extant machine 
politics seems determinant in explaining politicians’ strategies. In this analysis the traded 
institutions are tax compliance but this trade could be extensive to other institutions that 
encourage Informality. A more complete research should consider how the entrant builds a 
credible anti-clientelism reputation, the role of non-opportunistic motivations as well as the 
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